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THE CIVIL JURY AND
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
PAUL D. CARRINGTON*
Herbert Bernstein, like others who admire European institu-
tions,1 never acquired a taste for American civil procedure.2  Having
taught him precisely that course at the University of Michigan Law
School in 1965-66, I always took this as a personal failing on my part.
What Herbert and others of his persuasion are unable to appreciate is
the central importance in the American scheme of government of the
right to jury trial in civil cases.  As a tribute to him, I will explain one
more time why that institution is indispensable and why it explains
other features of American government that many international ob-
servers, and not a few Americans, find objectionable.
The importance of the institution is not measured by the number
of civil jury trials, which is not great.  It is, however, the right to jury
trial that makes the rest of the constitutional scheme acceptable.3
And other institutional arrangements were structured around the
concept of a democratic courthouse.  In this essay, I will briefly ac-
count for how the civil jury came to America, why it is here to stay,
and how other features of American civil litigation are linked to that
central institution.  My words are addressed in part to foreign lawyers
who are not intimately familiar with American institutions.
I.
As most readers likely know, the common law jury emerged in
the wake of the Norman Conquest of 1066.  For those not familiar
with the history of the institution, I briefly explain.  The jury had
Copyright © 2003 by Paul D. Carrington.
* Professor of Law, Duke University. Herbert Bernstein was in my civil procedure class
at the University of Michigan in 1965-66 and was my research assistant during the summer of 1966.
1. E.g., John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV.
823 (1985).
2. Herbert L. Bernstein, Whose Advantage After All? A Comment on the Comparison of
Civil Justice Systems, 21 U.C. DAVIS L REV. 587 (1988).
3. For an enthusiastic defense of the institution, see JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE
JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY (1994).
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roots in practices familiar to Anglo-Saxons brought to England from
the continent a few centuries before the Normans arrived.4  For the
Norman conquerors, it served as a means of securing participation by
the indigenous subjects of a new monarchy in their judges’ application
of the lash of royal power.  It was thus a source of social and political
stability.5
The ancient jury took two forms; the grand jury was an assembly
summoned from the hundred (a unit of local government) or the
larger shire to consider whether in an instance stated by the Crown a
crime had been committed and, if so, who should be prosecuted.  The
petty jury was a smaller group of men summoned from the commu-
nity to decide the guilt or innocence of a person so charged, or, in-
creasingly as time passed to decide civil cases.  Juries sat in the com-
mon law courts administered by the royal judges sent out from
Westminster to bring the king’s law to every shire of the realm.
The petty jury was increasingly used by the royal judges after
1215.  In that year, a papal edict withdrew the clergy from the conduct
of trials by ordeal, a method by which the royal courts had previously
invoked supernatural forces to resolve disputed matters.6  When that
device was withdrawn, the Crown issued a writ acknowledging that
his judges were on their own to devise an alternative.7  No longer
permitted to share the odium of decision with the divinity, the royal
judges resorted to the jury as a standard feature of their process, thus
substituting the community for the divinity as their partner in bearing
the weight of moral responsibility for many of their decisions.
Over the nine centuries in which the jury has been in use, it has
been radically transformed.8  Its one constant feature has been its
status as a representative of the community being governed.  Its one
constant function has been to lighten the burden of moral and politi-
cal responsibility otherwise borne by the judiciary, diffusing that re-
sponsibility through the community and thereby strengthening the
courts.  William Blackstone, so widely read in America, expressed the
4. JOHN P. DAWSON, A HISTORY OF LAY JUDGES 35-115 (1960).
5. Edith Guild Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 289 (1968).
6. The Fourth Lateran Council was the author.
7. Charles L. Wells, Origin of the Petty Jury, 3 L. Q. R. 97 (1911).
8. See THOMAS ANDREW GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE:
PERSPECTIVES ON THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY, 1200-1800, at 105 (1985).
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belief that the 18th century jury “ever has been, and I trust ever will
be, looked upon as the glory of the English law.”9
In its thirteenth century form, jurors were subjects drawn from
the community in which the dispute arose; they were identified as the
persons most familiar with the events in question who could thus de-
cide a dispute on the basis of their personal knowledge.  They were,
in a sense, the witnesses.
By the eighteenth century when Blackstone wrote, the petty jury
had been transformed again.  While still drawn from the community,
its members were called to decide factual issues on the basis of evi-
dence adduced by the parties.  The royal judge performed a limited
role as the presiding officer at a jury trial.  This was very important to
the English monarch because the royal judges were few in number
and were drawn from the landed gentry.
The royal judge thus merely instructed the jury on the law they
were called to enforce and ruled on objections by parties to the ad-
mission of evidence presented by an adversary.  He also wielded the
contempt power, i.e., the authority to impose summary punishment
on any subject who disturbed the decorum of the King’s court.10  But
because he was usually merely a facilitator of decisions and was so
seldom required to take primary responsibility for a decision, the
King’s judge (and thus the King) was usually able to avoid the odium
of responsibility for results.
The royal judge from Westminster would be sitting in the com-
munity in which the dispute arose and from which the jury was drawn.
A list or array of persons from which the jurors would be selected was
assembled by a local court officer on the basis of his personal knowl-
edge of the community and advice from clergymen and other com-
munity leaders.  They were, it has been said, “the Rotarians of their
day;”11 that is to say that they were persons of good repute in their
communities.  Some were then selected from the array by lot and
summoned as members of a venire who presented themselves as per-
sons available for jury service in a particular case.  They might be in-
terrogated by counsel or the judge to explore possible disqualifying
bias, for those who knew too much about the parties or events were
by the eighteenth century excluded from service.  Also, counsel would
be allowed to strike a number from the panel without stating a reason
9. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 379 (1768).
10. RONALD L. GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER 74-75 (1963).
11. Morris S. Arnold, The Civil Jury in Historical Perspective, in THE AMERICAN CIVIL
JURY 9 (1987).
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for his objection, thus affording the parties a measure of authority
over those who would decide their case.12
Twelve jurors would be selected as the petty jury to hear evi-
dence presented by the parties and to decide the case.  That number
was large enough to render individual members non-visible, but not
so large as to separate them from a sense of personal responsibility
for the decision.  After hearing the parties and receiving legal instruc-
tions from the judge, they retired to a private place for deliberation
and then returned a verdict.  They were required to be unanimous;
the effect of this rule was to place moral pressure to agree on those
who were prone to dissent, but yet to allow dissent as a means of rec-
ognizing an uncertainty about the appropriate result so profound that
no satisfactory decision could be reached.
The petty jury was not available in all English courts.  The Court
of Chancery, exercising its extraordinary power as the King’s con-
science, sat only at London and therefore had no access to local ju-
rors.13  Also sitting in London were three other royal courts of en-
during significance.  The High Court of Admiralty had jurisdiction
over matters arising at sea or involving maritime transactions.14  The
Court of the Constable and Marshal had jurisdiction over matters of
transnational importance.15  Also, after the break with the Pope, a
court with ecclesiastical origins was formed to administer family and
probate law.16
II.
Whether or not the jury was the glory of English law as Black-
stone affirmed, it was increasingly important to American colonists
because their relationship with the royal judges sent from England
became strained.  The right to jury trial was prescribed in the royal
charters, which governed each colony.  In Puritan New England,
where lawyers were scarce, experienced juries heard evidence and
12. Barbara Allen Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving “Its Wonderful Power,” 27 STAN. L.
REV. 545, 551 n.20 (1975).
13. For a brief account of the theory and development of The Court of Chancery, see JOHN
HAMILTON BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 112-34 (3d ed. 1990).
The Court was presided over by a chancellor who embodied both jury and judge; the chancel-
lor’s justice has developed into what is now called “equity.”  Id.
14. For an account of the High Court of Admiralty, see Timothy J. Runyan, The Rolls Ole-
ron and Admiralty Court in Fourteenth Century England, 19 AM. J. LEGAL. HIST. 95 (1975).
15. See BAKER, supra note 13, at 135 n.11.
16. For a brief account of the courts administering family and probate law, see DANIEL R.
COQUILLETTE, THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HERITAGE 209-10 (1999).
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rendered verdicts without the burden of hearing from lawyers.17
Elsewhere, jury practice adhered to the English tradition.  In all the
colonies, the institution was seen as a bulwark against the intrusive
tyranny of the King’s judges.18
All of the eleven state constitutions ratified before 1787 retained
charter provisions for the right to trial by jury in both criminal and
civil cases,19 and the institution was retained as well in Rhode Island
and Connecticut pursuant to their royal charters still in force.  Some
constitutions also provided for the grand jury as the source of crimi-
nal indictments.20  Although the new judges being selected in the for-
mer colonies did not represent the despised monarchy, they were per-
sons of no marked special status, yet they were assigned the large
political role of enforcing the state constitutions, interpreting demo-
cratic legislation, and shaping the common law.  This was an extraor-
dinary amount of power to confer on the fairly ordinary folks who
were to be the judges.
The Constitution of the United States, as proposed in Philadel-
phia in 1787, included a provision for a right to jury trial in any crimi-
nal proceeding brought in any federal court established pursuant to
Article III,21 but it was silent  about the mode of trial in civil cases.
The demand for such a right in civil cases was at the top of the agenda
of the Anti-federalists,22 who could readily foresee that the federal ju-
diciary would play a large and potentially anti-democratic role, a po-
litical role much larger than that traditionally played by the English
judiciary.  Their demand was granted in the Seventh Amendment.
17. JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? 19-46 (1983).
18. Charles Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L.
REV. 639 (1973) (examining the development of the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury);
Stanton D. Krauss, The Original Understanding of the Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial,
33 U. RICH. L. REV. 407 (1999) (arguing that the intent of the Seventh Amendment was to pre-
serve the right to jury trial that existed under the English common law).
19. For a compilation of early state constitutions, see THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (E. Duycinck ed., 1820).
20. See 1 SARA BEALE & WILLIAM C. BRYSON, GRAND JURY LAW & PRACTICE 1-41
(1986) (describing the historical development of grand juries).
21. U.S. CONST. art. III,  § 2, cl. 3.:
The Trial of All Crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury; and such
Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but
when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be held at such Place or Places as
the Congress may by Law have directed.
22. See THE ANTIFEDERALISTS 49-51, 231-33, 238-64, 397-98, 413-15 and passim (Cecelia
M. Kenyon ed., 2d prtg. 1985).  See especially the remarks of Patrick Henry.  Id. at 238-63.
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The Fifth Amendment also provided for indictment by grand jury in
criminal cases prosecuted in federal court.23
It is possible that the failure to include a guarantee of civil jury
trial in the Constitution, as proposed by the Philadelphia Convention,
was related to the enlarged concern of its members for English credi-
tors whose rights had been assured by the peace treaty.  It is generally
assumed, and not without reason, that juries are prone to favor civil
litigants who are members of the community whom they represent.
Insofar as it was the purpose of the Constitution to give comfort to
the foreign creditors with claims against local American debtors, who
were at that moment agitated by economic deflation, it made sense to
say nothing about the right to trial by jury in actions seeking to en-
force contracts and mortgages.  But farmers and debtors would not
tolerate suppression of their right to invoke the judgments of their
neighbors, so the federal Constitution was amended to assure that
judgments rendered against them would rest on verdicts made by ju-
ries.24  It was especially important to impose the right to jury trial on
the federal judiciary because they would be appointed “for good be-
havior” by a distant President of the United States.  Indeed, at the
Constitutional Convention there had been stout resistance to the
creation of any federal court other than the Supreme Court, and a
constitution was possible only if there were a compromise on that
point, and so Congress was grudgingly authorized to create such
judgeships.
It was important that the Seventh Amendment limited the right
to jury trial to “suits at common law.”  This was taken to mean that
there is no right to jury trial when a federal judge is exercising pre-
rogatives inherited from the English Court of Chancery in “suits in
Equity.”25  So it remains the law in the federal courts and in most (but
not all) states that there is no right to demand for jury trial in pro-
ceedings that would have been brought in Chancery, or in the other
English courts in which juries did not sit.  Most important among
cases so classified in the federal courts are suits for injunctions.  While
the distinction might be seen to be sensible as applied to that class of
23. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . . . .”)
24. Matthew P. Harrington, The Economic Origins of the Seventh Amendment, 87 IOWA L.
REV. 145 (2001) (arguing that the right to a civil jury was developed for functional reasons).
25. Fleming James, Jr., Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L. J. 655, 657-64
(1963) (outlining the historical test for trial by jury).
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cases, it is in other respects anachronistic because law and equity are
seldom distinguished for any other purpose.26
In criminal law, the jury had sometimes performed the function
of nullifying oppressive laws imposed by the Crown.  In democratic
America, it was still thought necessary to frustrate corrupt or other-
wise ill-motivated prosecutions.27  Because the jury is numerous and
transitory, it is almost invulnerable to bribery or intimidation.  As has
been said, it is the one institution in government that has no ambition
of its own.28  In these respects, the jury serves much the same purpose
as the separation of powers among the three branches of government.
Indeed it constitutes yet another separation of power, this within the
judicial branch.29
In its role in civil proceedings, the jury performs a comparable
function by rendering the legislators who make the controlling law
doubly accountable to the people, who first elect their lawmakers and
are then called to administer the laws those representatives make.
Law departing too far from the common understanding, from com-
mon sense, or from commonly shared moral values tends to be modi-
fied in its enforcement by civil juries to fit common habits of mind.
This accountability was also applicable to judges making the common
law.
In both criminal and civil matters, the presence of the jury shapes
the function of the American judge.  Francis Lieber, a German émi-
gré, published in 1852 a widely read book, Civil Liberty and Self Gov-
ernment, comparing American legal institutions with those he had ob-
served on the Continent.  He especially celebrated the civil jury as an
instrument of democratic government for its effect on the role of the
judge, noting that:
It allows the judge to stand, as the independent organ of the law,
not only above the parties, hostilely arranged against each other,
but also above the whole practical case before the court.30
26. Id. at 663-64.  See also Chauffers, Teamsters & Helpers Local 391 v. Terry, 494 U. S.
558, 575-76 (1990) (Brennan J.) (“[S]ince the existence of a right to jury trial therefore turns on
the nature of the remedy, absent congressional delegation to a special decisionmaker, there re-
mains little purpose to our rattling through dusty attics of ancient writs.”).
27. CLAY S. CONRAD, JURY NULLIFICATION: THE EVOLUTION OF A DOCTRINE 45-64
(1998) (explaining the use of jury nullification in America).
28. Stephen Yeazell, The New Jury and the Ancient Jury Conflict, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
87, 106.
29. Id.
30. FRANCIS LIEBER, CIVIL LIBERTY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT 234 (2d ed. 1874).
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He also approved of the jury as a device for securing “a mean of
views of facts, regarding which Aristotle said that many persons are
more just than one,” but without “the disadvantages and the injustice
of vague multitudes.”31
Lieber was also mindful of the secondary consequences of the
jury for the political system as a whole.  He observed that it makes
the judge “a popular magistrate looked up to with confidence and fa-
vor.”32  And that it “makes the administration of justice a matter of
the people” and thereby “awakens confidence” in the law.33  By giving
the citizen “a constant and renewed share in one of the highest public
affairs,” he noted, it “binds the citizen with increased public spirit to
the government of his commonwealth.”34 Thus, he thought, it is a
great institution for the development of the “love of the law” that
Montesquieu and others had identified as the essential spirit of a re-
public.35  Tocqueville had expressed the same thought in describing
the civil jury as a “gratuitous public school, ever open” that elevates
the political good sense of jurors.36
While Tocqueville and Lieber might be thought to have romanti-
cized the benign effects of the jury, there is strong empirical evidence
that jurors almost universally take their duties very seriously.37
Moreover, few persons who have experienced the role of juror have
left the courthouse without a sense of satisfaction that they have per-
formed a worthy public service.  Doubtless for many, that satisfaction
is mixed with a sense of having been inconvenienced, perhaps unnec-
essarily, and sometimes with frustration or disappointment, but even
then there is evident bonding of the citizen-juror to the community.
To some extent, the impulse to satisfaction is explained as an ap-
plication of a principle well known to social psychologists as the need
to resolve cognitive dissonance:38 persons exercising power are prone
31. Id. at 235-37.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. CHARLES DE SECOND, BARON DE  MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 29-31 (Tho-
mas Nugent trans., University of California, Berkeley 6th ed. 1977) (1748).
36. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE,  1 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 312 (Henry Reeves trans.,
undated) (1835).
37. See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 3-11, 141-62 (1966);
Shari S. Diamond, What Jurors Think, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 282
(Robert E. Litan ed., 1993).
38. The term was fashioned by Irving Goffman.  It forms the subject of JACK W. BREHM &
ARTHUR R. COHEN, EXPLORATIONS IN COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1962).
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to resolve their anxieties by concluding that they have done the right
thing.  On that account, a republic trusting its citizens to sit as jurors is
more likely to be trusted by them, and on that account is more likely
to remain a republic.  It is quite possible that Americans tolerate the
enlarged role of the judiciary in their political system because of the
trust derived from the existence of the civil jury.39
For all these reasons, the jury is here to stay in America.  Judges
like it;40 indeed in a very recent survey of 900 federal judges, only one
percent responded with the opinion that the jury system is in poor
condition and needs overhaul.41  Despite vigorous public relations
campaigns misinforming the public about the jury,42 and despite fre-
quent public disagreement with heralded verdicts, citizens also like it,
or at least prefer it to the alternatives.43  Elected officers who care
about their re-election are therefore no more likely to challenge the
civil jury than they are to question the practice of electing legislators.
III.
Few Americans have ever seriously questioned the use of the
jury in criminal cases.  While questions of its administration are raised
and debated from time to time, usually in the aftermath of a cele-
brated trial,44 there has never been a serious proposal to deny access
to a jury for those accused of crime.
39. Yeazell, supra note 28, at 111-17.
40. Paula L. Hannaford, B. Michael Dann & G. Thomas Munsterman, How Judges View
Civil Juries, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 247 (1998).
41. See generally Allen Pusey, Judges Rule in Favor of Juries: Survey by Morning News,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 7, 2000, at 1J.
42. STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE POLITICS OF REFORM
(1995) (examining common political rhetoric through the use of empirical data); ELLEN E.
SWARD, THE DECLINE OF THE CIVIL JURY 101-45 ( 2001) (arguing that procedural, structural
and substantive changes in the law have diminished the role of the jury); Marc Galanter, News
from Nowhere: The Debased Debate on Civil Justice, 71 DENV. U. L. REV. 77 (1993) (explaining
that debate on jury reform is anchored on political myths); Marc Galanter, Real World Torts:
An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093, 1109-12 (1996) (debunking the assumption that
juries are capricious and erratic); Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Be-
havior of the Tort Litigation System – And Why Not? 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147 (1992).
43. See Valerie Hans, Attitudes Toward the Civil Jury: A Crisis of Confidence, in VERDICT:
ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 248, 277, supra note 37. See also Michael J. Saks, Public
Opinion about the Civil Jury: Can Reality Be Found in The Illusions, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 221
(1998); STEPHEN J. ADLER, THE JURY TRIAL AND ERROR IN THE AMERICAN COURTROOM
136-44 ( 1994).
44. E.g., VINCENT BUGLIOSI, OUTRAGE: THE FIVE REASONS O. J. SIMPSON GOT AWAY
WITH MURDER (1996).
3CARRINGTON_FMT 09/10/03  4:12 PM
88 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 13:79
The use of juries in civil cases has occasionally been questioned.
Jerome Frank45 and Chief Justice Warren Burger,46 both twentieth
century appellate judges holding life tenure, and neither of whom sat
as a trial judge or practiced as a trial lawyer, were bold enough to
criticize it as a source of irrationality.  There is also some empirical
evidence that appellate judges in American courts are likely to doubt
the competence and integrity of juries.47  Corporate executives and
some foreign litigants who find themselves litigating in American
courts tend to fear juries, supposing that “anything can happen” in a
jury trial.48  To that degree, the civil jury is controversial.49
The first point to be made is that many assumptions commonly
made about juries are erroneous.  The concern most frequently
voiced is that the civil jury is xenophobic and afflicted with reverse
class bias leading to irrational generosity to the poor and irrational
hostility to wealthy multi-national corporations.  Such assumptions
disregard the undisputed fact that jurors, with few exceptions, take
seriously their duties as officers of the law.  There is solid evidence
that American juries are less xenophobic than international litigants
suppose.50  There is also abundant evidence that their verdicts on the
merits of cases presented to them correspond closely to the judgments
that presiding judges would make on the same evidence.  Jury awards
for general damages are only marginally less predictable than, and
correspond closely to, damages assessments by judges and lawyers.51
It is rare that a presiding judge disagrees strongly with a jury verdict.52
With respect to the fixing of compensatory damages, there is more of
a difference. However, the evidence demonstrates that jury awards
setting a value on pain and suffering are on average marginally higher
45. JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 114-
15 (1949).
46. Warren E. Burger, Thinking the Unthinkable, 31 LOY. L. REV. 205, 210-20 (1985).
47. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Anti-plaintiff Bias in Federal Appellate
Courts, 84 JUDICATURE 128 (2000).
48. See NORMAN F. CANTOR, IMAGINING THE LAW: COMMON LAW AND THE
FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN LAW 227 (1997) (“In American courts – with juries waiting to
sock it to big corporations with seemingly infinite deep pockets, and lax or populist or incompe-
tent judges letting liability run riot – anything can happen.”).
49. See Symposium on The Jury, 54 SMU L. REV. 1681 (2001).
50. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia in American Courts, 109 HARV.
L. REV. 1120 (1996).
51. Roselle L. Wisler, Alice J. Hart & Michael J. Saks, Decisionmaking About General
Damages: A Comparison of Jurors, Judges and Lawyers, 98 MICH. L. REV. 751 (1999).
52. See Pusey, Judges Rule in Favor of Juries, supra note 41.  Ninety-seven percent of the
federal judges reported that they agreed with jury verdicts all or most of the time.
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than those assessed by judges,53 but their awards estimating the value
of future economic loss are marginally lower.54  And judges reduce
jury awards that seem to them excessive.  There is no evidence to
support the belief that juries are influenced by the depth of a defen-
dant’s pocket,55 but juries seem prone to hold corporations to higher
standards of conduct than they might impose on individual defen-
dants.56  This may reflect the not unreasonable belief that fictional
persons enjoying immortality receive greater rewards from their con-
duct than do individual entrepreneurs engaged in the same conduct
and have less justification for putting individuals at risk.  On the other
hand, juries are prone to be suspicious of personal injury claims, and
are marginally less likely than judges to decide in favor of injured par-
ties.57
Any evaluation of the risks associated with juries should take ac-
count of the alternatives.  All American judges are selected in part
because of their political predispositions, and most are accountable in
some way to the people they serve.  It is not clear that they are on the
whole materially less xenophobic or less class-biased than jurors, or
even that they are more strongly committed to the disinterested en-
forcement of the law.  Years of service on the bench can lead to moral
fatigue and cynicism.  To the extent that bribery or intimidation is a
factor in American civil litigation, and they are not large factors, the
concern is directed at judges, not jurors.  Doubtless the decision to
demand a jury or not is often informed by knowledge of the judge
likely to try the case if a jury is not called.
53. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending Em-
piricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124, 1126 (1992); Neil Vidmar & Jeffrey J. Rice, Assessments of
Noneconomic Damage Awards in Medical Malpractice Negligence: A Comparison of Jurors with
Legal Professionals, 78 IOWA L. REV. 883 (1993).  Cf. Harry Kalven Jr., The Dignity of the Civil
Jury, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055, 1063-68 (1964)(earlier study which placed jury awards at 20% higher
than those of judges).
54. JAMES K. HAMMIT, AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COMPENSATION: PAYMENTS BY AUTO
INSURERS 45-46 (1985); JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID IN
AVIATION ACCIDENT LITIGATION 86-95 (1988); VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING
THE JURY 160-162 (1986).
55. See, e.g., NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY:
CONFRONTING THE MYTHS ABOUT JURY INCOMPETENCE, DEEP POCKETS, AND
OUTRAGEOUS DAMAGE AWARDS (1995); Valerie P. Hans & William S. Lofquist, Jurors’
Judgments of Business Liability in Tort Cases: Implications for the Litigation Explosion Debate,
26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 85 (1992).
56. Valerie P. Hans, The Illusions and Realities of Jurors’ Treatment of Corporate Defen-
dants, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 322 (1998)
57. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS 2000 ANNUAL REPORT (2000)
http://www.ncsconline.org/About_the_NCSC/PDFs/%20ar.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2002).
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Other problems with the civil jury are less frequently observed
but more substantial.  Five seem worthy of note.  The first is that jury
trials are more costly, both in time and treasure, than “bench trials” in
which the evidence is evaluated by a judge.  There are more people in
the courtroom.  Even jurors are paid a modest fee.  Their attention
spans are more limited, requiring that evidence be received fewer
hours a day, with more breaks.  Documentary evidence must be more
fully explained.  There are likely to be more conferences between
counsel and the court.  A careful count suggests that a jury trial takes
about half again as long in elapsed time as a bench trial.58
For this and perhaps other reasons, the jury is seldom used today
in civil cases in England,59 and almost as seldom in other English-
speaking jurisdictions such as Canada and Australia.60  It bears notice,
however, that those nations have quite different histories and political
systems.  In their traditions of parliamentary governments, the legisla-
ture is or was supreme and the political role of the courts was, until
recent times, much diminished.  They were therefore less in need of
the moral support provided by community participation in decisions.61
As the judges of those countries are thrust (or have thrust them-
selves) into larger political roles, the wisdom of engaging civil juries
to resolve some matters may regain its ancient visibility.
To some extent, the disadvantage in relative cost of a jury trial
may be balanced by the economy of the judge’s effort that must be
invested in deciding cases without help of a jury.  A judge deciding a
case after trial without a jury must state his or her findings of fact and
conclusions of law so that an appellate court can evaluate his or her
decision.62  In a complex case, this can be taxing work requiring care-
ful review of the testimony transcript.  Even in a simple case, the task
of deciding a case without a jury is morally and emotionally more
burdensome for the judge than presiding over a jury trial.  It is not
uncommon for months to elapse while the trial judge is working on
the findings and conclusions.  While jury deliberations can be pro-
58. HANS ZEISEL, HARRY KALVEN JR. & BERNHARD BUCHHOLZ, DELAY IN COURT  96
(1959).
59. JOHN BALDWIN & MICHAEL MCCONVILLE, JURY TRIALS (1979).
60. Neil Vidmar, Canadian Criminal Jury: Searching for Middle Ground, 62 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 141 (Spring 1999); Paul Byrne, Jury Reform and the Future, in THE JURY
UNDER ATTACK 190 (Mark Findlay & Peter Duff eds., 1988) (discussing the system in place in
Australia).
61. P. S. ATIYAH & ROBERT SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN
LAW 198-335 (1987).
62. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 52.
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longed, they cannot forsake even temporarily the responsibility to
reach a conclusion as judges sometimes do, and juries render verdicts
in hours or days, not weeks or months.
A second problem is the indirect cost of the jury resulting from
the need to control the process of proof by the imposition of the law
of evidence,63 a corpus of law not known to the civil law tradition of
continental Europe.  The strictures on the admissibility of evidence
are designed in part to protect laymen from beguilement and inflam-
mation by sharp lawyering, but they serve also to complicate trials
and are thus a source of added cost.  They preclude the admission of
some evidence that might be useful and enlarge the possibility of mis-
trial.  Judges who hear evidence day after day are almost surely less
vulnerable to lawyers’ forensic tricks; hence, while the Federal Rules
of Evidence apply to bench trials as well as jury trials, there is far less
concern for the issues raised by their administration when there is no
jury to hear the presentations.
Third, the jury imparts structural rigidity to civil procedure that
is not encountered in other legal systems.  Rigidity results from the
need to present evidence orally and in a proceeding that is as compact
and continuous as possible.  Once a jury is assembled, a judge must be
reluctant to grant prolonged adjournments making it doubtful
whether the same jury can be reconvened.  Parties and counsel who
are required to present their evidence at such a compact hearing must
be prepared, for the risk of surprise at trial is endemic.  Accordingly,
great importance was attached by common law courts to the plead-
ings by which the adversaries notified the court of the contentions
they would advance at trial.  While some cases were by consent tried
without juries, the procedure employed adhered to the oral tradition
required by the use of juries.  Whether cases were to be tried with or
without a jury, nineteenth century reforms were fashioned to compel
parties to forecast the trial for one another in more specific detail.64
When that proved inadequate, twentieth century reforms expanded
the use of discovery devices available to counsel seeking evidence for
use at trial and foreknowledge of the adversary’s evidence.  American
discovery practice, so distasteful to corporate defendants, whether
American or otherwise, is thus a secondary consequence of the right
63. For an accessible current account, see ROGER C. PARK ET AL., EVIDENCE LAW: A
STUDENT’S GUIDE TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE AS APPLIED TO AMERICAN TRIALS (1998).  For
a comparative treatment, see MIRJAN R. DAMAÓKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT (1997).
64. CHARLES E. CLARK ET AL., HANDBOOK OF THE CODE PLEADING 54-58 (2d ed. 1947).
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to trial by jury in civil cases and the oral tradition associated with that
right.
While the need for continuity and orality present problems, they
are not without compensating advantages.  Discontinuity can be a
cause of delay in other legal systems,65 and heavy reliance on written
presentations can diminish the satisfaction parties may obtain from
the opportunity to present their contentions in open court to someone
or some group who appear to take a serious interest in what they
have to say.66  A jury trial, whatever its shortcomings, is a dramatic
and not a bureaucratic event.  Moreover, the drama is widely per-
ceived to influence the integrity of witnesses; it is less stressful to sign
a false affidavit than it is to lie in the presence of a judge, jury and ad-
versary counsel. 67
A fourth consequence of the civil jury is the emergence of a po-
litical constituency for laws administered by juries, particularly the
law of torts as it has evolved in the fifty states.  There are many who
regret that development, especially those responsible for the welfare
of manufacturing firms, virtually all of whom seek what they denote
as tort law reform.68  It is true that American tort law is very expen-
sive as a means of compensating harms to accident victims and con-
sumers; substantially less than half the money paid by tort defendants
is received by tort plaintiffs; the rest goes to lawyers and other par-
ticipants in the process.69  Proponents of various schemes to displace
tort law with less costly accident insurance are confronted with a
deeply seated conservatism that may be in part associated with the
self-reassuring experience of many Americans who have sat as jurors.
Finally, the right to jury trial in civil cases has numerous implica-
tions for the role of lawyers in litigation, who are cast as champions
for their clients in a form of combat.  As Lieber observed, it is the
65. Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Some Comparative Reflections on First Instance Civil Pro-
cedure: Recent Reforms in German Civil Procedure and in the Federal Rules, 63 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 609, 614-22 (1988).
66. JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS (1975).
67. Richard L. Marcus, Completing Equity’s Conquest? Reflections on the Future of Trial
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 725, 757-62 (1989).
68. Their view was forcefully stated by PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL
REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988) and WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION
EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT (1991).
69. See generally ALFRED F. CONARD ET AL., ACCIDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS: STUDIES
IN THE ECONOMICS OF INJURY 248-52 (1964).
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source of the adversary tradition and thus shapes the membership and
ethics of the American legal profession.70
The civil jury in the federal courts now responds to somewhat
different needs than those animating the Anti-federalists in 1788.
Presidents and Senators are now directly elected by the people,
whereas they were not in 1788; these changes diminished somewhat
the need for citizen participation.  Also, the communities that existed
in the eighteenth century were much stronger than those now existing
in the twenty-first century.  America is much more an aggregation of
individuals than of communities and the conception of a verdict as an
expression of community values has less to commend it.  On the other
hand, the federal courts play a much larger role in the political system
and in the American national life than they did at an earlier time; in
this respect the need for separation of powers within the judiciary has
been steadily elevated.  And increased individualism elevates the
need of the legal system for roots in the morality of the public it
serves even if those community roots must be artificially constructed.
Citizen participation in the disposition of civil cases has been an
important, indeed central, and perhaps critical, element in the devel-
opment of the American legal system.  To abandon that idea would
require deep constitutional change in the social and political struc-
ture.  The system has served many purposes, but its enduring purpose
has been to secure a greater measure of trust in judicial institutions.71
Japan is presently introducing lay participation in criminal pro-
ceedings in its courts and contemplates extension of the use of lay
citizens in civil matters.  Perhaps the Japanese are in this respect
headed in the right direction. 72  I am not here advocating the civil jury
for Japan or any other country, but I am certain that democracy is
needed at the American courthouse.
Quite possibly as Bernstein believed, there is a German advan-
tage in civil procedure if the matters to be litigated are contracts be-
tween businessmen.  Leaving such cases to highly professional judges
who will control the proceedings may make a lot of sense.  That ad-
vantage is less apparent when one considers other kinds of cases
having larger political consequences, or where the class or political
70. LIEBER, supra note 30.
71. See generally Paul D. Carrington, The Role of the Jury in Civil Dispute Resolution, 1990
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1.
72. The Justice System Reform Council, Recommendations for the Justice System Reform
Council – For a Just System to Support Japan in the 21st Century, at http://www.kantei.go.
jp/foriegn/judiciary/2001/0612report.html (June 12, 2001).
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biases of the judge have more bearing.  It is still less apparent if one
accepts the reality that all American judges are politicians before they
are judges.  And in a highly diverse society that has always been un-
der great centrifugal force, the advantage lies with a system that de-
mocratizes the courthouse, that trusts its citizens to participate in
making consequential decisions, and places the legal profession and
its judges in a subordinate relationship to the people.
